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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA JEAN MADSEN and \
BARBARA JEAN MADSEN as \
GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF DEBORAH JEAN MOFFIT, a minor,
J
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vs.
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[

ESTATE OF EUGENE TIFTON \
MOFFIT, JR., DECEASED, AR- /
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•

'

•

Case No.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Estate of Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., Arlene C.
Moffitt, and Arlene C. Moffitt as Guardian ad litem of
Michael Moffitt, a minor, appeal from summary judgment in an action to adjudicate adverse claims to the
ownership and right to receive the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., who
died accidentally on July 16th, 1974.
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondents, Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara
Jean Madsen as Guardian ad litem of Deborah Jean
Moffitt, a minor, brought this action against Appellants
and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States to determine the ownership and right to receive
the proceeds of the group life insurance policy #12560,
After paying the policy proceeds into the Court, the insurance company was dismissed as a party. Appellants
and Respondents filed motions for summary judgment
based on the pleadings, attached exhibits, and stipulation of the facts. After a hearing on the motions and
memoranda of authorities submitted by both parties,
the Court below granted the motion of Respondents and
denied the motion of Appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek the reversal of the judgment of the
lower court and the granting of judgment in favor of
Appellants as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The decedent, Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., as an employee of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, was insured on his life
by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States under a continually existing group life insurance
policy. The policy, #12560, was issued to the decedent
in January, 1958, with a supplemental policy being issued February 1st, 1967. Both policies were not for a
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fixed sum but based on a sliding scale proportional to
the salary of the insured. The policies are sufficiently
similar in terms and identical in value so as to allow
treatment as a single policy for purposes of this appeal.
I n 1967, the decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean
Madsen, entered into a stipulation in a property settlement made in contemplation of divorce. Paragraph 3
of the stipulation reads:
3. The defendant hereby stipulates and agrees
to maintain in full force and effect the life insurance he presently maintains through group
coverage in connection with his employment for
the benefit of plaintiff and the minor child, and
in addition, to maintain health and accident insurance through such group coverage for the benefit of the minor daughter of the parties.
The divorce decree became final on December 7th,
1967. At that time, the Equitable Assurance policy
#12560 was worth a total of $18,000.00. Respondents
base their claim for all the proceeds of policy #12560
on Paragraph 4 of the divorce decree. While alive, the
decendent fully conveyed all property so ordered under
the decree to Respondents and fully carried out all support obligations to them. The only contention on the
part of Respondents as to a failure to perform the obligations of the divorce decree relate to the decedent's
subsequent change of beneficiary on the life insurance
policy.
,
On May 28, 1968, the decedent married Appellant,
Arlene C. Moffitt. Shortly after his remarriage, on
June 11, 1968, the decedent changed the named bene-
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ficiary on the Equitable Assurance policy from Respondent to Appellant. Decedent died July 16, 1974 intestate.
At that time, the policy was worth a total of $34,000.00
and constituted the only sizeable asset in the estate of
the decedent.
Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffitt, the child of decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, was seventeen years old at the date of decedent's death and has
since reached her majority. Appellant, Michael Moffitt,
the child of decedent and Appellant, Arlene C. Moffitt,
was two years old at the date of his father's death and
will be three years old on June 15,1975.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVISION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE WAS INTENDED BY THE PARTIES
TO SERVE AS SECURITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE BY THE DECEDENT OF HIS
DIVORCE OBLIGATIONS.
The Appellants, unlike the claim recently asserted
in Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis (Utah Supreme Court No. 13662, Filed January 24, 1975), do
not contend that the divorce decree provision ordering
the maintenance of insurance is void or otherwise unenforceable. Rather, Appellants assert that the divorce
decree provision being a contractual obligation should
be interpreted so as to give effect to the intentions of
the contracting parties. As stated in Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Ui2d 204,398 P.2d 207 (1965):
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In interpreting a provision in a contract, this
court will try to determine the intention of the
parties, and a defendant, normally, is bound only
to the extent the terms expressly indicate, or at
least fairly and reasonable imply an obligation,
at 205, 206.
In determining the intentions of the decedent and Respondent in entering into the stipulation to maintain
the insurance policy which was subsequently incorporated into the divorce decree, the background and surrounding circumstances of the agreement should be considered. Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Ut.2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973). This
should also include an consideration of the usual legal
obligations existing at the time of the contracting to
determine if any extra-ordinary obligations were intended by the parties.
The general rule is that due to the limited nature
of alimony, a divorce court cannot normally order a
husband to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the
former wife. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation,
§613. The reasoning of the majority of courts is that
an order to pay insurance premiums is in the nature
of alimony, and that obligation ceases at the death of
the husband. Additionally, courts hold that they have
no authority allowing them to give a former wife a
benefit which derives solely from the husband's death
as opposed to a benefit arising out of the marital relationship itself. 59 ALE 3d 9. There is a split of authority as to the power of a divorce court to order the
maintenance of insurance when that order is based on
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a provision of a prior property settlement between the
parties. In Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis,
supra, this Court addressed the issue for the first time,
holding that under Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended 1973, a divorce court could order the
maintenance of an existing life insurance policy on the
husband for the benefit of the wife and children.
In the present appeal, no reconsideration of the
power of a divorce court to order the maintenance of
an insurance policy for the benefit of the wife need be
made. Paragraph 3 of the stipulation required the decedent to maintain certain insurance for the " benefit
of plaintiff and the minor child." But, in Paragraph 8
of the same stipulation, the plaintiff, now the Eespondent, being "wholly capable of self-support" waived "any
claim she may have to receive alimony." The order to
maintain insurance was not made therefore as alimony
to be paid in a lump sum.
The second possible intention of the parties and
purpose of the divorce court in incorporating the provision on insurance would be to provide additional child
support payments beyond the monthly payment of $75.00
ordered in the decree. In Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113,
53 P. 1010 (1898), this Court held that the determination of whether the obligation to support a child survived the death of the father depended on the nature
and terms of the divorce decree. The Utah position was
reaffirmed in Colombo v. Walker Bank and Trust Co.,
26 Ut. 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998 (1971). In Colombo, while
noting the great flexibility of Section 30-3-5, supra, this

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court held that a divorce provision requiring insurance
on the life of the father to be maintained in a set amount
for the child until the child had completed college or
other educational training did not necessarily show that
the support obligation was to continue against the father's estate. Bather, this Court concluded that the insurance, which was of a set amount, was to take the
place of the monthly support obligation placed on the
father while living. It was determined that the father
was not leaving the child an estate in addition to the
support obligation, but had merely concluded that the
amount of the insurance proceeds was the amount necessary to support the child until emancipated should the
father die prior to this time.
Colombo, supra, is in accord with the general rule
that a divorce court cannot award any of the father's
property to the children since a father is only obligated
to support his children, not to settle an estate on them.
Under this rule, it has been held that a divorce court
lacks the power to order a father to maintain life insurance for a child since this goes beyond the normal
support obligation. 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Separa, §837. In addressing this issue, the Colorado Supreme
Court held a divorce decree ordering the maintenance
of a life insurance policy of $10,000.00 for each child as
irrevocable beneficiary void stating:
The purpose of the law is to continue in effect
after divorce the same legal obligation of support which the father owes to the children from
their birth to their majority, where the marriage
continues throughout that period. This obligation does not include any legal duty on the part
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of the father to take out an insurance policy on
his life in favor of each child. . . . It can hardly
be contended that the law places upon the divorced parent any greater obligation toward his
children than he has in the absence of divorce.
Laws v. Laws, Colo., 432 P.2d 632 (1967), at 635.
In the case at bar, the deceased entered into a stipulation to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his
minor child. There is no language in the agreement to
show that the parties contemplated imposing any greater
obligation on the deceased than his legal duty to support his minor child. Under the doctrine of Murphy v.
Moyle, supra, a support obligation which is to continue
after the father's death must be shown by the nature
and terms of the decree or it will be assumed that the
obligation terminated with the death. The instant decree contains no such exceptional language. Therefore,
a reasonable interpretation of the provision to maintain insurance would be that the parties intended that
the insurance serve as a type of security for support
payments in the case that the father died prior to the
child reaching her majority. Such an interpretation is
similar to that of Colombo, supra.
The concept of providing security for the payment
of a support obligation is founded in Utah law. In
Murphy v. Moyle, supra, this Court affirmed the requirement that the husband furnish a lien on certain
property as security for his support obligations stating
that the security could be required when it appears to
be needed or equitable. The concept was extended in
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) when
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this Court sanctioned a lower court order for the defendant in a divorce proceeding to obtain a set amount
of insurance with the plaintiff as beneficiary. The insurance was to be maintained until the defendant had
extinguished his debt to the plaintiff. The case was remanded to determine if the defendant was correct in
asserting his uninsurability and to decide if a property
lien might not be adequate security.
Unlike the provision in Travelers Insurance Compawy v. Lewis, supra, the present provision is limited
to the minority of the decedent and Respondent's child.
In Traveler's Insurance, this Court held that the term
"minor children" as used in the divorce decree " . . . was
merely descriptive of their status at the time, and we
think it was not meant to make them contingent beneficiaries only during their minority." Such a conclusion was warranted in that case since at the time of the
decree one of the children was not a minor legally but
seventeen years old and married. Since the parties in
Travelers Insurance also agreed to maintain child support for this child despite her reaching her legal majority, the parties clearly did not intend to restrict the
children from being beneficiaries simply because of their
reaching their majority. Additionally, the provision in
Travelers Insurance was conditioned on the wife remarrying or dying. The futuristic nature of either of these
conditions again emphasizes the intention of the parties
not to limit the children as beneficiaries based on their
reaching majority. Very different facts are present in
the instant appeal. Here, the decedent agreed to maintain the life insurance policy for the benefit of his minor
9
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child and in the same paragraph to maintain health and
accident insurance for his minor child. In Paragraph
6 of the divorce decree, and Paragraph 2 of the stipulation, the decedent and Eespondent agreed that the support obligation of the child would terminate upon the
child reaching majority. Taken as a whole, the divorce
decree clearly shows that the parties intended all child
support to terminate when the child reached majority.
Thus, the intention of the parties in agreeing to maintain the insurance was to maintain it only during the
child's minority.
Since the decedent and Eespondent clearly did not
intend the insurance to serve as alimony and appear to
have intended the insurance to only be maintained during the minority of their child, Appellants contend that
the insurance should be viewed as security for the payment of the support obligations of the decedent under
the reasoning of Dixon v. Dixon, supra. Once the obligation was terminated, here once the minor child reached
majority, the requirement of security would no longer
be needed. Eespondent, Deborah Jean Moffitt, reached
her majority on February 28, 1975. Appellants would
therefore propose that if Eespondent, Deborah Jean
Moffitt, has not received any child support payments
from the date of decedent's death to the date of her
majority that such payments be awarded out of the
insurance proceeds at the rate of $75.00 per month as
per the divorce decree. Additionally, Appellants would
propose that a sufficient amount of the insurance proceeds be put in escrow for Eespondent, Deborah Jean
Moffitt, to allow her if she desires to pursue a college
10
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education or other professional training even though the
decedent was not so legally obligated.
POINT II
THE BENEFICIARY OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY WHICH A DIVORCE COURT
HAS ORDERED TO BE MAINTAINED CANNOT REASONABLY EXPECT NOR ACTUALLY RECEIVE AN AMOUNT OF PROCEEDS GREATER THAN THAT EXISTING
AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE.
Even if the insurance is not viewed as security for
performance of a support obligation, and is viewed as
disposition of property which confers vested interests
in Respondents, Appellants would contend that Respondents could not reasonably expect to receive any greater
amount than the amount of proceeds existing at the
time of the decree. Despite the increase in the amount
of proceeds from the time of the decree to the date of
death in Travelers Insurance v. Lewis, supra, this issue
was not raised in that case nor in any prior Utah decision.
Under this view, Appellants would not contend that
Respondents have no interest in the insurance proceeds.
Rather, Appellants would argue that Respondents cannot reasonably be entitled to any more proceeds than
they would have received if the decedent had died on
the day of the stipulation and divorce decree. While
there is little case law on point, two recent cases have
considered the question, White v. Michigan Life Insurcmce Co., 43 Mich.App. 653, 204 N.W.2d 772 (1972), and
Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 415 F.2d
312 (10th Cir. 1969).
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White v. Michigan Life Insurance Co., supra, involved facts very similar to those at bar. The decedent
agreed in a divorce decree to maintain a group life insurance policy issued by Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States on his life for the benefit of
his minor children. Actually, the decedent was insured
under two group life insurance policies, one by Equitable Life worth $15,000 at the time of the decree, and
the other issued by Michigan Life Insurance Company
worth $2,000.00 at the time of the divorce decree. The
decedent never named his children as beneficiaries under either policy, but he did subsequently name his second wife as beneficiary under both policies. At the date
of his death, both policies were still in effect and had
increased in value to $25,000.00 on the Equitable Life
policy and $6,000.00 on the Michigan Life policy. The
Michigan court found that the divorce judgment applied
only to the Equitable Life policy and was limited to the
insurance in existence at the time of the divorce decree.
The court awarded $15,000.00 to the first wife, presumingly as trustee for the children, and $16,000.00, the
amount of the after-acquired value of the insurance, to
the second wife. The court concluded that the intent of
the parties in entering into the insurance provision of
the divorce decree was only to give the first wife and
children the amount of insurance in existence at the time
of the decree.
Similarly, in Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra, a divorce decree incorporated a property
settlement requiring the decedent to maintain a group
life insurance policy on his life for the benefit of the
12
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first wife for a period of ten years. Three years later,
the decedent acquired survivorship benefits in connection with the same policy. Five years after the divorce
decree, the decedent remarried and changed the beneficiary on the policy, including the original and survivorship benefits, to his second wife. Decedent died and the
second wife claimed all the benefits by the insurance
contract while the first wife claimed all the proceeds
by the divorce decree. The Tenth Circuit Court held
that the first wife was only entitled to the insurance in
existence at the time of the divorce decree and not to
the survivorship rights which came into existence three
years after the divorce decree even though such benefits were connected with the same policy. Thus, the second wife was awarded the survivorship proceeds while
the first wife received the original policy proceeds.
In the case at bar, Appellants argue that the Equitable Life Insurance policy #12560 was worth a total
of approximately $18,000.00 on December 7th, 1967, the
date of the divorce of the decedent and Respondent.
The policy was worth $34,000.00 on July 16th, 1974 the
date of the death of the insured. The after-acquired
value of the insurance amounts to $16,000.00 and under
the reasoning of White v. Michigan Life, supra, and
Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra, this
amount should be awarded to Appellants.
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CONCLUSION
The provision of the property settlement as incorporated into the divorce decree requiring the decedent
to maintain the Equitable Life Insurance policy #12560
for the benefit of Respondents should be construed in
accordance with the intent of the parties to the agreement. Unless language clearly points to a contrary result, the intent of the parties should be interpreted as
creating no greater obligation than that which is imposed under the law. The present stipulation and divorce decree contain no language which would imply
that the parties contemplated any obligation greater
than that normally imposed on parents to support their
children until majority. The provision ordering the
maintenance of insurance should be construed in light of
this Court's sanction of requiring security for the performance of support obligations.
If the insurance is not viewed as security and Respondents are viewed as having acquired a vested interest in the proceeds, this interest should be limited to
the amount of insurance in existence at the time of
the divorce decree. Such a limitation would be in accordance with the intents of the parties at the time of
entering into the agreement since the amount existing
at the time of the decree is the most that Respondents
could have reasonably expected to receive.
Appellants would urge the Court to grant the proceeds of Equitable Life Assurance policy #12560 to Appellants with a reservation of funds for Respondent,
14
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Deborah Jean Moffitt, sufficient to pay any past due
child support at the rate of $75.00 per month, and if
applicable, sufficient funds in escrow to allow her to
pursue a college education or other professional training. In the alternative, Appellants would urge the Court
to grant the proceeds of Equitable Life Assurance policy
#12560 acquired and accumulated after December 7th,
1967, the date of the divorce decree, to Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VAN SCIVER of
ATHAY, BOWN & VAN SCIVER
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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